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I. INTRODUCTION
As the highest court in the land, the Supreme Court receives an enormous
amount of attention from legal, political, and economic commentators. Ever
since the Court gained almost complete discretion over the cases it chooses to
review, the certiorari process has been one of the easiest targets for those
disappointed with the Court's work product. One complaint is that the Court
is not taking enough cases. A second complaint is that the Court is not taking
the "right" cases. This paper will examine the criticism that the Court is not
taking enough business-related cases.
In 1993, U.S. News & World Report published an article based on its
survey of conservative and liberal commentators' views on the conduct of the
Supreme Court.' The article, in discussing the fact that the Court is deciding
fewer cases each term, stated that "the main losers as the docket shrivels are
those [cases] disputing vital, if less visible, issues like taxes, pensions, federal
benefits and maritime law."2
David G. Savage wrote in December 1995 that "[s]ome pro-business
conservatives certainly wish the current Court were more active. They have
an aggressive agenda that seeks limits on both compensatory and punitive
damages, greater recognition of property rights, and a restraint on
environmental regulations, among other things. 3 Savage also reported that
some business attorneys believe that the Court should understand the need to
resolve business issues quickly due to the importance of long range planning
in the corporate arena." For instance, Roy T. Englert Jr., a Washington

I See Ted Gest, The Court: Deciding Less, Writing More, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 28,
1993, at 24.
2
Id.
3
David G. Savage, Docket Reflects Ideological Shifts: Shrinking Caseload, Cert Denials Suggest
an Unfolding Agenda, ABA J., Dec. 1995, at 40,42.
4

See id.
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attorney, stated: "We think the Court ought to place more weight on the
importance of an issue, rather than sitting back and waiting for a clear circuit
split to develop." 5
Many lawyers have also questioned whether law clerks are withholding
business issues from the Justices.' In 1993, Kenneth Starr, a former Supreme
Court law clerk, expressed his concern about the Court's management of its
docket. Starr stated that "[a]ll too often these days, the court [sic] is
abdicating its responsibility to select complex cases with considerable
practical importance; these are often cases of immense importance to
business."' Starr believes the Court is not choosing the right cases because it
has delegated too much responsibility to the law clerks who prepare the
memos on cases from the "cert pool. ' '9 'This judicial Bermuda Triangle,
[created by the use of the law clerks and the cert pool,] has succeeded in
choking off much of the important but unglamorous business-related issues
from the contemporary court's docket."'
Also in 1995, Stephen R. McAllister, another former Supreme Court law
clerk, wrote:
From their prior clerkship experience, Supreme Court clerks are
unlikely to have had much exposure to or be particularly interested in
state law or commercial law issues. Both the law clerks and the
Justices demonstrate remarkably little interest in commercial cases,
even when they involve vast sums of money or are of considerable
practical importance to an entire industry or industries. Instead, they
appear far more interested in the "sexier" constitutional issues
involving individual rights, in particular such areas as religion, speech
and due process, or in unusual issues involving obscure provisions in
the Constitution or arcane federal statutes. Thus, corporate entities
and business interests generally may have a more difficult time
persuading the Supreme Court to grant cert."

6

at A23.
8

Id.
I
See id.
Kenneth Starr, Rule of Supreme Court Needs a ManagementRevolt, WALLST.J., Oct. 13,1993,

Il

9

See id. The cert pool refers to all cases petitioning for certiorari to the Supreme Court.

10

Id.

1

Stephen R. McAllister, Practice Before the Supreme Court of the United States, 64 J. KAN.
B.A., Apr. 1995, at 25, 27.
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The problem with these statements is that the commentators have merely
claimed there is a problem. They have failed to state what harms have
resulted from the Court's so-called inaction in this area or precisely what
cases the Court should have taken. If the Court is not taking the right number
of business cases, how many should the Court be reviewing each term? Why
is the Court not taking the right number of business cases? Is the explanation
simply that the Justices (or their law clerks) are not interested in these issues?
Do the business issues before the Court provide a compelling reason for the
Court to grant review? What are the other possible explanations for the
Court's behavior?
This Comment will analyze the Supreme Court's decision-making process
with respect to certiorari petitions. It will first discuss the origins of the
Supreme Court's discretion over its docket and the tools it uses to exercise
that discretion throughout the certiorari process, including the Court's rules,
the cert pool, the discuss list, the conferences, and the Rule of Four. This
Comment will compare the Court's activity in non-tax business cases to its
review of tax cases. The analysis section discusses possible explanations for
the Court's case selection decisions, including the influence of amicus curiae
briefs and unresolved intercircuit conflicts.
The number of tax cases that the Court reviews is being studied in an
attempt to determine the number of "unglamorous" cases the Court should be
taking. If the Court is not taking non-tax business cases because they are not
"sexy," it should also be taking fewer tax cases. If, however, the Court is
acting similarly in both areas, it may not be true that the Court is not interested
in non-tax business cases. Instead, it may be that the non-tax business cases
and the tax cases before the Court have not presented compelling reasons for
the granting of review. 2
II. BACKGROUND
A. Jurisdiction
1. THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS AcT OF 1891

In 1891, with the passage of the Circuit Court of Appeals Act, 3 Congress
attempted to control the workload of the Supreme Court. 4 It created nine
12
This study did not attempt to review all certiorari petitions filed during the time periods
discussed. Such research was beyond the scope of the study conducted.
13

Judiciary Act of 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826 (1891).

14

See DORIS MARIE PROVINE, CASE SELECTION IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 10

(1980).
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intermediate federal courts of appeals and restricted the right of appeal in
certain cases to review only upon the issuance of a writ of certiorari by the
Supreme Court.' 5 "The essential purpose of the... Act was to enable the
Supreme Court to discharge its indispensable functions in our federal system
by relieving it of the duty of adjudication in cases that are important only to
the litigants."' 6
Justice Frankfurter further noted:
In order to justify the establishment of the Circuit Courts of Appeals
it was necessary to view certiorari as "a power which will be
sparingly exercised, and only when the circumstances of the case
satisfy us that the importance of the question involved, the necessity
of avoiding confict between two or more courts of appeal, or between
courts of appeal aa the courts of a State, or some matter affecting the
interests of this nation in its internal or external relations demands
such exercise."!"
It was not until the passage of the Judiciary Act of 1925 that the Court
gained almost complete control over its docket. 9 With the passage of the
1925 Act, "the writ of certiorari began to assume the major role that it now
occupies in the Court's jurisdictional framework."'
2.

TuE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1925

While testifying before the House Judiciary Committee in 1924 in support
of the Judiciary Act of 1925, Justice Van Devanter stated:
[M]ore than two-thirds of the cases which come [to the Supreme
Court] under our obligatory jurisdiction - from State courts, circuit
courts of appeals, district courts, and the Court of Claims - result in
judgments of affirmance by our court, and also a goodly number are
ultimately dismissed for want of prosecution. This, we think,

15
16

See idz
Dick v. New York Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 437, 448 (1959) (Frankfurter,dissenting). See also

ROBERT L STERN ET. AL, SUPREME COURT PRACICE 163 & n. 3 (7th ed. 1993) (referring to Frankfurter's
dissenting opinion in Dick as containing background and history on the Judiciary Act of 1925) [hereainafter

SUPREME COURT PRACnCE].
17

1"
19
20

Dick,359 U.S. at449-50 (quoting Forsyth v. CityofHammond, 166 U.S. 506,514-515 (1897)).
Judiciary Act of .1925, 43 Stat. 936 (1925).
See SUPREME COURT PRACTIC, supra note 16, at 162-63 & n. 2.
1&
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illustrates that the present statutes are too liberal - that they permit
cases to come to us as of right with no benefit to the litigants or the
public. What we learn of the cases in examining them confirms and
emphasizes this conclusion. Of course, in proportion as our attention
is engaged with cases of that character, it is taken away from others
which present grave questions and need careful consideration.2
Congress responded by passing The Federal Judiciary Act of February 13,
1925, which expanded the Court's discretion in the use of the writ of
certiorari.22 "[Aippeals as of right still constituted an important segment of
the Court's business, [but] they were far outnumbered by the certiorari cases
in which review depended solely on the Court's discretion. 23
Chief Justice Taft stated:
The sound theory of [the Act of 1891] and of the new Act is that
litigants have their rights sufficiently protected by a hearing or trial
in the courts of first instance, and by one review in an intermediate
appellate Federal court. The function of the Supreme Court is
conceived to be, not the remedying of a particular litigant's wrong, but
the consideration of cases whose decision involves principles, the
application of which are of wide public or governmental interest, and
which should be authoritatively declared by the final court.24
While the Justices of the Supreme Court were in favor of the Judiciary
Act of 1925, the change in the operation of the Court had its critics. Felix
Frankfurter and James M. Landis wrote in the HarvardLaw Review:
If the Court's time were wholly given to the adjudication of cases and
the preparation of opinions, the annual output of opinions would
remain substantially the same. But if its labors also demand the
prompt disposition of petitions for leave to come before the Court,
there is a necessary deflection of the intellectual resources of the
Court available for opinion writing. Therefore the desire, and indeed,

21

Felix Frankfurter& James M. Landis, The Supreme Court UndertheJudiciaryAct of 1925,42

HARv. L REv. 1 (1928) [hereinafter Frankfurter& Landis, Judiciary Act of 1925].
2
See SPREME COURT PRACrICE, supra note 16, at 162-63 & n.2.
23
Id. at 163 & n. 4 (citing FEDERAL JUDiCIAL CENTER, REPORT OF THE STUDY GROUP ON THE
CASE OF THE SUPREME COURT AI0-Al1 (1972), 56 F.R.D. at 622-23).
24
Dick, 359 U.S. at 453 (quoting William Howard Taft, The Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
Under the Act of February 13, 1925, 35 YALE LJ.1,2 (1925).
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the necessity to keep abreast of business will operate as a pressure to
decide cases without opinions.25
As early as the 1928 Term, "[t]his competition between deciding cases
and determining what cases should come before the Court, ha[d] already led
to marked changes in the proportion of the number of weeks allotted to
argument and the number of weeks devoted to the study of petitions and
records and the writing of opinions."26 On July 1, 1928, the Court instituted
Rule 12, which formally gave the Court the discretionary powers granted to
it by Congress. 2" Rule 12 required petitioners to submit a statement
concerning the jurisdictional basis of their appeals.' "The Court [would]
retain[] the case for argument only after a finding that 'probable jurisdiction
has been shown."' 29
3. THE Acr OF 1988
In 1988, the members of the Supreme Court signed a letter to Congress
requesting that the mandatory jurisdiction of the Court be further limited.3 °
"Congress responded to the Justices' pleas and eliminated virtually all of the
remaining elements of the mandatory jurisdiction."'3' As a result of the
legislation enacted in 1988, the Court was no longer obligated to hear cases:
(1) where a state court upheld a state statute challenged as being in opposition
to the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States; (2) where a federal
court in a civil case held a federal statute unconstitutional; and (3) where a
federal court of appeals held a state statute unconstitutional."
With these changes to its jurisdiction, the Court gained almost total
discretion over what cases it decides by full opinion.33 Through its rules, the
Supreme Court has provided litigants with the minimum requirements

See Frankfurter & Landis, Judiciary Act of 1925, supra note 21, at 6.
Felix Frankfurter and James M. Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court at October Term
1928, 43 HARV. L REV. 33, 36 (1929) [hereinafter Frankfurter & Landis, October Term, 1928].
2
See id. at 43. See also SUP. Cr. R. 12, 275 U.S. 603-604 (1928).
23
See Frankfurter & Landis, October Term, 1928, supra note 26, at 43.
9
Id. The requirement of the former Rule 12 is now contained in Rule 14.
30
See Arthur D. Hellman, The Shrunken Docket of the RehnquistCourt, 1996 Sup. Cr. REv. 403,
409 (1996) [hereinafter Hellman, Shrunken Docket]. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1257.
31
See Hellman, Shrunken Docket, supra note 30, at 409.
32
See id. at 410.
33
See William M. Richman and William L Reynolds, Elitism, Expediency, and the New
Certiorari: Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 CORNELL LREV. 273 (1996) (discussing the
importance of full written opinions in the federal judicial system).
2
2
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necessary for a certiorari petition to be accepted by the Supreme Court.' The
Justices, however, have never fully explained precisely what is needed to
obtain a grant of review. They also have never fully discussed their decisionmaking procedures in the certiorari process or how they exercise their
discretion in that process.
The reasons why the Justices decide to grant or deny review remain
cloaked in the silence of the Court. The lack of knowledge about the certiorari
process has given the Court's critics almost total discretion in providing their
own explanations about what influences the Justices' decisions.
B. How the CourtExercises its Jurisdiction
1.

SUPREME COURT RULES
Rule 10 of the Supreme Court defines the guidelines for the certiorari
process as follows:
(1)

34

Review on a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of
judicial discretion. A petitionfor a writ of certiorariwill be
granted only for compelling reasons. The following,
although neither controlling nor fully measuring the Court's
discretion, indicate the character of the reasons the Court
considers:
(a)
a United States court of appeals has entered a
decision in conflict with the decision of another
United States court of appeals on the same important
matter; has decided an important federal question in
a way that conflicts with a decision by a state court
of last resort; or has so far departed from the
accepted and usual course ofjudicial proceedings, or
sanctioned such a departure by a lower court, as to
call for an exercise of this Court's supervisory
power;
(b)
a state court of last resort has decided an important
federal question in a way that conflicts with the
decision of another state court of last resort or of a
United States court of appeals;
(c)
a state court or a United States court of appeals has
decided an important question of federal law that has

See generally SUPREME COURT PRACTICE, supra note 16.
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not been, but should be, settled by this Court, or has
decided an important federal question in a way that
conflicts with relevant decisions of this Court.
A petition for a writ of certiorari is rarely granted when the asserted
error consists of erroneous factual findings or the misapplication of
a properly stated rule of law.35
Justice Harlan, commenting on the discretionary nature of the certiorari
process at the New York City Bar Association in 1958, stated that
"[flrequently the question whether a case is 'certworthy' is more a matter of
' One of the main considerations
'feel' than of precisely ascertainable rules." 36
of the certiorari process is the importance of the issue involved. 7 Due to its
to focus on problems that are
overwhelming workload, the Court attempts
38
"beyond the academic or the episodic."

2. CERTIORARI
In 1996, the Supreme Court disposed of 6,687 certiorari petitions.39
Assuming that a certiorari petition is filed correctly, the Clerk of the Court
dockets the petition pursuant to Rule 1.' After a brief in opposition or a
waiver of the right to file a brief in opposition is filed, the Clerk distributes
copies of the documents to all the Justices' chambers, pursuant to Rule 15.5."'
After the certiorari papers are distributed, it typically takes the Court two
weeks to determine whether or not to grant the request for review.42 However,
Sup. CT. R. 10 (emphasis added). While Rule 10 describes the criteria the Justices use to
determine whether or not to grant review, Rules 12 through 14 and 33 describe the procedure for filing the
petition. In the filing process, litigants must be careful to follow the requirements of Rule 12, which
discusses filing fees, the required number of copies, and the deadlines for a conditional cross-petition. See
Sup. CT. R. 12. Rule 13 states that a petition is timely if it is filed with the Clerk of the United States
Supreme Court within 90 days after final judgment or denial of discretionary review by the state court of
last resort, or final judgment in a United States Court of Appeals. See SUP. CT. R. 13. Rule 14 discusses
the contents of the certiorari petitions. See Sup. CT. R. 14. Rule 33 sets the page limits, cover color, and
page size of the various documents filed with the Supreme Court. See Sup. CT. R. 33.
3
See SUPREME COURT PRACTICE, supra note 16,at 166 & n. 7.
3"
See id. at 184-93.
38
Id. at 184 (quoting Rice v. Sioux City Cemetery, 349 U.S. 70,74 (1955).
39
See The Supreme Court, 1996 Term, 111 HARV. L REV. 51,435 (1997).
40
See SuP.CT. R. 1.
41
See Sup. CT. R. 15.5. The Clerk of the Court distributes paid certiorari petitions every
Wednesday and in forna pauperis petitions every Thursday. The Clerk will not wait for the petitioner to
file a reply brief before the certiorari papers are distributed. See SUPREME COURT PRACTICE, supra note
16, at 225.
42
See SUPREME COURT PRACTICE, supra note 16, at 225.
35
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when the Court is in recess, no action is taken on the certiorari petitions until
the Court reconvenes in late September.43
a. The CertiorariProcess and the Flimsy
As the certiorari petitions are received in the Justices' chambers, their law
clerks prepare a one to two page memorandum summarizing the petitions."
The memorandum, which is called a "flimsy,"4 discusses "whether the case
is properly before the Court, what federal issues are presented, how they were
decided by the courts below, and summarizing the positions of the parties pro
and con the grant of the case." The Justices can make their decision based
solely on the flimsy or they can read the certiorari papers themselves.4 7
Regardless of the extent to which the Justices actually read the certiorari
as to every
papers, each Justice "is responsible for a personal judgment
4
clerks.""
his
to
delegate
may
he
much
however
petition,
In contrast to the concerns expressed when the Judiciary Act of 1925 was
first passed that the certiorari process would take the Court's focus away from
its more important duties, Justice White observed that the certiorari process
is "not as hard as it might sound." 9 Justice Brennan said:
I find that I don't need a great amount of time to perform the
screening function-certainly not an amount of time that
compromises my ability to attend to decisions of argued cases. In a
substantial percentage of cases I find that I need read only the
'Questions Presented' to decide how I will dispose of the case.-'
The practice of the Court seems to support Justices White and Brennan's
comments. The Court ordinarily denies certiorari petition in 60 percent of the

43
4

See id.
See iz at 226.

'3

See id.

46

Id. (quoting Justice Brennan, The National Court of Appeals: Another Dissent, 40 U. CHI. L

REv. 473,477 (1973)).
47

See id

Id. (quoting Speech by Justice Powell before the Fifth Circuit Judicial Conference, El Paso,
Texas (April 11, 1973)).
49
49

Id. at 227 (citing Justice White, The Work of the Supreme Court: A Nuts and Bolts Description,

54 N.Y. ST. B.J. 346,349 (1982)).
5D
Id. at 227 & n. 17 (quoting Justice Brennan, The National Court ofAppeals: Another Dissent,
40 U.CHI. L REV. 473,477 (1973)).
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paid cases and in 90 percent of the in forma pauperis petitions "with a
minimum of time and effort." 5 1
b. The Cert Pool
In order to streamline the review process, the Justices instituted the cert
pool. The cert pool allows the Justices to utilize each other's law clerks for
the preparation of one common, initial memorandum for each petition. 2
However, the Justices often have one of their law clerks prepare a separate,
non-pool memorandum. 3
Justice Stevens is the only member of the Court who does not participate
in the cert pool.' This does not mean that Justice Stevens considers the
certiorari papers more than the other Justices. In fact, Justice Stevens has said
that he does "not even look[] at the papers in over 80 percent of the cases that
are filed."'5
c. The Discuss List
The cases that the Chief Justice believes would merit review are placed
' The Discuss
on the "Discuss List."56
List usually contains only 30 percent of
the petitions that are filed. Any Justice may add a case to the Discuss List
before the weekly Friday conference.58 The other 70 percent of the cases that
do not make it onto the Discuss List are automatically denied review without
discussion.5 9 The Discuss List is never published, and therefore it is
60
impossible to know which cases the Justices discussed in conference.

51

Id.

52

See id. See also David M. O'Brien, Join-3 Votes, the Rule of Four, the Cert Pool, and the

Supreme Court's Shrinking Plenary Docket, 13 J. L & PoL 779, 801 (1997).
53
See SUPREME COURT PRACTICE, supra note 16, at 227.
54
See id.at 799.
55
Id. at 801 (quoting DAVID M. O'BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT INAMERICAN
POLTCs (4th ed. 1996) at 164).
56
See SUPREME COURT PRACTICE, supra note 16, at 227.
57
See id.
58
See i
59

See id.

60

See id.
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d. The Conference and The Rule of Four
The Justices consider the remaining 30 percent of the certiorari petitions
that are placed on the Discuss List at their weekly Friday conferences. 6' The
first conference of the term spans a number of days due to the number of
certiorari petitions that were received over the summer recess. 62
In order for the Court to grant review, a petition for a writ of certiorari
must receive the votes of four Justices - the so-called "Rule of Four., 63 Four
votes in favor of review are required even when only eight Justices participate
in a conference." When there are only six or seven Justices present, the rule
is sometimes relaxed.6' There is also evidence that the rule has been relaxed
in other circumstances." In a letter to Senator Wheeler, Chief Justice Hughes
wrote that "if two or three of the Justices are strongly of the opinion that
certiorari should be allowed, frequently the other Justices will acquiesce in
their view."'6 During the Senate Judiciary Committee's consideration of the
Judiciary Act of 1925, Justice Van Devanter testified, "We proceed upon the
theory that when as many as four members of the court, and even three in
some instances, are impressed with the propriety of our taking the case, the
petition should be granted.""
At the conclusion of the conference, the most junior member of the Court
informs the Clerk of the Court of the decisions made on certiorari.69 The
Clerk then prepares the order list, which is released on the following
Monday. 0

61
See id at 229. The conferences begin with the Justices shaking each other's hands. The Chief
Justice starts the consideration of each certiorari petition by stating the facts and issues and then giving his
recommendation for its disposition. The remaining Justices may then give their comments on the certiorari
petitions in order of seniority. After each Justice who wants to speak has spoken, the voting takes place with
the Justices voting in reverse order of seniority. See id. at 229-30 (citing CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIsT, THE
SUPREME COURT 289-90 (1987)).
62
See id. at 230.
63
See O'Brien, supra note 52, at 784.
64
See SUPREME COURT PRACrcE, supra note 16, at 231.
6

See id.

66

6

See id.
Id at 231 &n. 30.
id.

69

See id. at 230.

70

See id.at 228.

67
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e. Dissents
Most orders denying plenary review do "no more than announce the
simple fact of denial." 7 Beginning in the late 1940s, individual Justices began
noting the reasons why they disagreed with certain denial orders.72 While
these dissents do not provide a complete picture of the Court's decisionmaking process, they do indicate the types of cases that individual Justices
believe are certworthy.
Since the initiation of their use, the number of dissenting opinions has
dramatically increased. 73 From 1949-1952, there was an average of fifty-six
dissenting opinions per term.74 By the 1960s that number increased to over
200 per term.75 In the 1970s, Justice Douglas wrote a dissenting opinion for
every case in which he opposed the denial order, resulting in 477 dissents in
1973 alone.76 Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented from the denial orders
that resulted in the upholding of a death sentence.' During their last term
together on the Court (1989-90), the two Justices wrote 218 dissents. 7' Every
Justice has not been in favor of this behavior. Justice Frankfurter noted that
dissents from the denial to grant review damage the "integrity of the certiorari
process. 79
C. Law Clerks
The reliance on law clerks, of which each Justice is allowed to hire up to
four, has expanded over the years.8 0 There is concern in the entire federal
judicial system that judges will have to spend more time supervising and less
time judging as they delegate more responsibility to their clerks.8 Questions

77

Id. at 234.
See id.at 236.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id
See id

79

See id

71
7
73
74
7s
76

See O'Brien, supra note 52, at 791-92 (quoting a Memorandum from Justice Frankfurter to
Justice Harlan).
so
See Richard A. Posner, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Survive Until 1984? An Essay on
Delegation and Specialization of the Judicial Function, 56 S.CAL. L REv. 761,767 (1983). Law clerks
typically are from the top law schools in the nation. Most have clerked for a federal circuit judge before
coming to the Supreme Court. See also McAllister, supra note 11. at 27.
8,
See Posner, supra note 80, at 767-68.
79

174
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have also been raised about the duties of the law clerks. "What are these able,
intelligent, mostly young people doing? Surely not merely running citations
in Shepard's and shelving the judge's law books. They are, in many
situations, 'para-judges.' In some instances, it is feared, they are indeed
invisible judges .... . 2 By delegating functions, such as the preparation of
the cert pool memorandum, it has been said that litigants first have to convince
the law clerks that their petitions are certworthy.8 3 This extra hurdle may
make it harder to persuade the Justices to grant cert."
III. ANALYSIS
A. How the Court Exercises its Jurisdiction- The Statistics
1. NON-TAx BUSINESS CASES
The subjects used in this study to represent non-tax business issues
include: (1) Antitrust; (2) Bankruptcy; (3) Patents/Copyrights; (4) Banking;
and (5) the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)/Securities. Much of
the law that applies to business organizations and their relationships in society
is governed by the states. 5 However, the subjects listed above are generally
considered to be federal law. 6
The number of cases that the Court hears will, of course, be dependent on
the evolution of and trends in each of the categories that are being discussed.
Also, if the Court is confronted with cases that predominately involve state
law issues, or fewer cases are being litigated, the Court inevitably will take
fewer cases.
This study examined the Supreme Court Terms of 1924, 1925, 1934,
1935, 1954, 1955, 1974, 1975, 1994, 1995, and 1996. Two years within each
decade were chosen to control against either a sharp rise or decline in the
number of opinions in any one year. The study began with 1924 in order to
include years before the Court gained total discretion over its docket in 1928.87

12

ld at 769-70 (quoting Alvin Rubin, Views From The Lower Court, 23 U.C.L.A. L REv. 448,

456 (1976)).
3
See McAllister, supra note 11. at 27.
"
See id.
5
See Stanley Siegel, Corporations and Other Business Organizations, in FUNDAMENTALS OF
AMERICAN LAw: NEW YORK UNIvERSrY SCHOOL OF LAW 331 (Alan B. Morrison ed., 1996).
6

See generally FUNDAMENTALS OF AMERICAN LAW: NEW YORK UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

(Alan B. Morrison ed., 1996).
8
See Frankfurter& Landis. October Term, 1928, supra note 26. 1928 is considered the year in
which the Court gained the full discretionary powers granted to it by the Judiciary Act of 1925.
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Thereafter, the study examined two years in every other decade starting with
1934.
a. The 1920s
Between 1924 and 1925, the percentage of non-tax business cases that
were heard by the Court fell one percent, from eight to seven. In 1924, 18 of
the 232 cases decided by the Supreme Court involved non-tax business
issues. 8 That year, the Court heard seven cases involving antitrust issues; ten
cases involving bankruptcy; and one case involving intellectual property. 9 In
1925, 15 of the 209 cases decided by the Supreme Court involved non-tax
business issues. 9' That year, the Court heard two cases involving antitrust
issues; nine involving bankruptcy; and four involving intellectual property. 9'
b. The 1930s
The percentage of non-tax business cases that were heard in 1934 (16
percent) and 1935 (14 percent) differed by only two points, but these
percentages were double those from the previous decade. In 1934, 25 of the
156 cases decided by the Court involved non-tax business issues.' That year,
the Court heard one case involving antitrust issues; eight involving banking;
nine involving bankruptcy; and seven involving intellectual property. 93 In
1935, 20 of the 146 cases decided by the Court involved non-tax business
issues.9' That year, the Court heard three cases involving antitrust issues; ten
involving bankruptcy; five involving intellectual property; and two involving
banking. 95
c. The 1950s
The percentage of non-tax business cases that were heard by the Court in
1954 (17 percent) was almost identical to those in 1934 and 1935. In 1955,
however, non-tax business cases accounted for only four percent of the docket.

U

See Frankfurter & Landis, JudiciaryAct of 1925, supra note 25, at 20-21.
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See id.
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See id.
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See id.
See The Business of the Supreme Court at the October Terms, 1935 and 1936, 51 HARV. L
REV. 577, 608-09 (1938).
93
See id.
See id.
See id.
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In 1954, 14 of the 81 cases decided by the Court involved non-tax business
issues. 96 That year, the Court heard twelve cases involving antitrust issues;
one involving banking; and one involving the SEC or securities.9 7 In 1955, 4
of the 94 cases decided by the Court involved business issues.9" That year, the
Court heard two cases involving antitrust issues; one involving bankruptcy;
and one involving the SEC or securities."
d. The 1970s
The percentage of non-tax business cases that were heard in 1974 (12
percent) was close to the percentages in 1934, 1935 and 1954. The percentage
in 1975 (6 percent) was half that of 1974. In 1974, 16 of the 137 cases
decided by the Court involved non-tax business issues.'0" That year, the Court
heard nine cases involving antitrust issues; three involving bankruptcy; one
involving intellectual property; and three involving the SEC or securities.0 1
In 1975, 9 of the 159 cases decided by the Court involved non-tax business
issues."°2 That year, the Court heard three cases involving antitrust issues; two
cases involving intellectual property; and four cases involving the SEC or
securities.'0 3
e. The 1990s
The percentages of non-tax business cases that were heard by the Court
in the 1990s, range from a high of 11 percent in 1995, to a low of 2 percent in
1996. In 1994, 3 of the 86 cases decided by the Court involved non-tax
business issues."°4 That year, the Court heard one case involving bankruptcy
issues; one involving the SEC or securities; and one involving banking.'0 5 In
1995, 9 of the 79 cases decided by the Court involved business issues.'06 That
year, the Court heard one case involving antitrust issues; five cases involving
bankruptcy; one case involving intellectual property; and two cases involving

The Supreme Court, 1954 Term, 69 HARV. L REV. 119,205-06 (1955).
id.
The Supreme Court, 1955 Term, 70 HARV. L REV. 95, 101 (1956).
id.
The Supreme Court, 1974 Term, 89 HARV. L REV. 1,279-81 (1975).
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See The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 HARV. L REV. 1.280-82 (1976).
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See The Supreme Court, 1994 Term, 109 HARV. L REV. 10, 346-48 (1995).
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the SEC or securities."° In 1996, 2 of the 86 cases decided by the Court
involved non-tax business issues."° That year, the Court heard one case
involving bankruptcy issues; and one case involving banking. 9 The
following chart summarizes the data:' 0
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f. Discussion
It is true that in recent years the Court has been hearing fewer non-tax
business cases. This fact, however, may not be as significant an issue as it may
seem at first glance. In 1934, the Court heard the highest number of non-tax
business cases of any other period studied."' With only two non-tax businessrelated cases disposed of with full opinions, 1996 was the year that the Court
heard the least number of these cases. It is important to note that since 1954,
there has not been a significant change in the number of non-tax businessrelated cases disposed of with full opinions. The number of full opinions has
ranged from a high of sixteen in 1974, to a low of four in 1955, and two in
1995.
The critics of the certiorari process must believe that there is an optimal
number of non-tax business cases that the Court should hear. They have not,
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See id.
See The Supreme Court, 1996 Term, supra note 37. at 437-39.
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See Appendix A for graphs of the data.
The Court's increased interest in non-tax business cases thatyear may have been due to the fact
that the country was deep in the Great Depression.
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however, defined the "ideal" number. If, to arrive at the "ideal" number, it is
assumed the Court was behaving properly in the 1930s (during the Great
Depression) the conclusion could be reached that each term between 14 and 16
percent of the Court's opinions should pertain to non-tax business issues. It
would then follow from this conclusion that anything below that range is too
few. Therefore, in 1995, with only 2 percent of the full opinion dealing with
non-tax business issues, the Court was acting improperly. The problem with
this argument is that there is no basis for using the 1930s as the standard. The
critics of the certiorari process must first define what the standard is before they
state the conclusion that the Court is not taking enough non-tax business cases.
If the trends over time are compared to the present number and percentage of
non-tax business issues that are considered by the Supreme Court, the situation
is not as alarming as first perceived. For instance, the Court took only 1 percent
fewer non-tax business cases in 1994 than it did in 1955. The Court also took
only 1 percent fewer non-tax business cases in 1995 than it did in 1974.
Viewed in this light, it does not seem that the Court's actions are glaringly
inappropriate.
2. TAx CASES
Tax cases provide a benchmark for determining the number of unglamorous
cases that the Court should be taking. If the claim is that the Court is not taking
enough non-tax business cases because they are not "glamorous" or "sexy," the
natural extension of that argument would be that the Court is also taking fewer
tax cases. If the Court's behavior with tax cases is similar to its behavior with
non-tax business cases, it would be hard to argue that the Court is not taking
non-tax business cases simply because it is not interested in the issues they
present.
The percentages of tax cases heard by the Court demonstrate a more
consistent decline in this category than in non-tax business-related cases. The
percentage of tax cases range from a high of 31 in 1935 to a low of 1 in 1995.
The percentage of full tax opinions for the dates examined in the study are as
follows: 14 percent in 1924; 13 percent in 1925; 21 percent in 1934; 31 percent
in 1935; 9 percent in 1954; 11 percent in 1955; 6 percent in 1974; 3 percent in
1975; 3 percent in 1994; 1 percent in 1995; and 5 percent in 1996. The
following chart summarizes the data: 112
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See Appendix B for graphs of the data.
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The decline in the percentage of tax cases heard by the Court is more
striking than the decline in non-tax business cases. While the statistics show
that there has been a reduction in both areas, the decline seems to be more
systematic and steady in the tax area than in the non-tax business category.
Another interesting phenomenon is that since 1975, the percentages in both
categories are not that dissimilar. Since 1975, the percentages of tax cases are
3, 3, 1, and 5. The percentages for non-tax business cases in the years studied
are 6, 3, 11, and 2. If tax cases represent the Court's obligation to take
unglamorous cases, the similarity between the Court's behavior in these areas
would indicate that the decline in the non-tax business cases is not due to lack
of interest, but is simply indicative of the operation of the current Court.
B. Category Specific Discussion
Even though business law is predominantly state law in nature, there are
still a number of issues that are governed by federal law." 3 A possible
explanation for the declining number of business cases that are reviewed by the
Court may be found in the statistics of the workload of the federal judiciary.
For example, in 1990, there were 569 antitrust cases filed in the Federal District
Courts."' In 1997, that number had fallen to 158."' More dramatically,
SEC/securities cases fell from 2,550 in 19906 to 226 in 1997."1 Also,
intellectual property cases fell from 5,634 in 19901 to 448 in 1997." 9

"3

See Siegel, supra note 85, at 331.
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See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL WORKLOAD

STATISTICS (Dec. 31, 1990).
1S
See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL WORKLOAD
STATISTICS (Dec. 31, 1997).
116
See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS (1990), supra note 114.
11
See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS (1997), supra note 115.
1s
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See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS (1990), supra note 114.
See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS (1997), supra note 115.
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Even though these trends do not cover all of the subjects in the non-tax business
category, they do indicate that certain types of federal non-tax business
litigation have declined in the 1990s. Legislative changes and judicial decisions
that have occurred in recent years may explain this decline in the cases. These
changes are most evident with antitrust and securities law.
1. ANTrrRUST
Litigation resulting from mergers that the government believes will violate
the nation's antitrust laws has declined since the passage of the Hart-ScottRodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976. n" This act requires the parties
involved in mergers and acquisitions over a certain asset size to submit a
substantial amount of information to the government 30 days prior to the
merger's completion.' The pre-merger notification allows the government to
determine if it will seek to stop the merger through litigation.,2 2 More
importantly, the notification requirement alerts the government to potential
competitiveness problems and gives the parties to the merger the opportunity to
modify their plan to solve the problems and thereby gain the government's
3
approval without the resort to litigation.1
The government also limits its antitrust litigation through consent decree
negotiations.' 2 "Most recently, the Antitrust Division appears eager to use
consent decrees as a tool to avoid the costs, delays, and uncertainties in civil
litigation or where it is investigating conduct that has not been the subject of
antitrust challenge by the government in recent years."' 12 ' The use of consent
decrees and the pre-notification requirements may explain the decline of
antitrust litigation in the federal judicial system.
2. SECUMrTIES
The Court's recent decisions affecting securities law may have lessened the
number of securities cases that are filed. In 1994, a decades-old precedent was
overturned when the Court refused to read an implied cause of action against
aiders and abettors of securities fraud into Section 10(b) of the Securities and

120
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1311 et. seq.. See also Spencer Weber Wailer, Prosecutionby Regulation:
The ChangingNature of Antitrust Enforcement, 77 OR.L REV. 1383, 1397-98 (1998).
121
See Harry First, Antitrust Law, in FUNDAMENTALSOFAMERcANLAw: NEW YORK UNIVERSrrY

SCHOOL OF LAW 427, 443 (Alan B. Morrison ed. 1996).
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Exchange Act of 1934.126 Suits against aiders and abettors "had been the most
widely used theory to hold nonprivity parties responsible for such violations."' 27
The Court also eliminated the ability of private securities purchases to sue under
Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933. The Court held that Section 12(2)
of the Act pertained only to public offerings of securities.'2
While it may be too early to determine the impact of the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995,29 the Act's reform of securities laws has been
described as "the most momentous event in the history of securities regulation
since the adoption of the Securities Acts in 1933 and 1934." 130 In passing the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Congress amended the
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to impose
"significant additional requirements on plaintiffs suing in federal court to
recover for securities fraud."' 3' The Act created a higher standard for private
securities litigation. 32 By creating a higher standard of review, the Act may
lessen the number of frivolous securities lawsuits in the federal judicial system.
C. PossibleReasonsfor the Court's Case Selection Decisions
"Once the feeling gains ground that certiorarisare granted where they
should have been denied and are denied where they should have been granted,
the whole mechanism of certioraricomes into question."' 33 As demonstrated
by the critics mentioned in the introduction of this paper, many individuals have
come to believe that the Court has improperly exercised its discretion in the
certiorari process.
Every aspect of the certiorari process - from the use of the cert pool, the
Justice's reliance on law clerks, and the effects of the Court's shrinking docket
- has been examined and/or questioned. But the commentators are not raising

126
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a et. seq.. See also Keith A. Rowley, The Sky is Still Blue in Texas: State
Law Alternatives to Federal Securities Remedies, 50 BAYLOR L REv. 99, 103-04 (1998) (discussing
Central Bank of Denver N.A. v. F'rst Interstate Bank of Denver N.A., 511 U.S. 164 (1994)).
127
Rowley, supra note 126, at 103-04 (quoting Lewis D. Lowenfels & Alan R. Bromberg, A New
Standardfor Aiders and Abettors Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 52 Bus.
LAW. 1, 1 (1996)).
In
See id. at 104 (discussing Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561 (1995)).
129
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1 et.seq.. See HAROLDS. BL.oOmENTHAL&SAMuELWOLFF, SECURrIES
LAW SERIES: EMERGING TRENDS IN SECURIIEs LAW, 1997-98 Edition, vii (1997) ("The Act is not old
enough to draw conclusions as to the long-term outlook.").
13
BLOOMENTHAL & WOLFF,supra note 129, at vii.
131
See Rowley, supra note 126, at 102.
132
See id. at 106.
133
Frankfurter & Landis, October Term, 1928, supra note 26, at 50 (quoting Moore, Right of
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the right issues. The commentators have done little more than state their
conclusions that the Court is not taking enough business cases. The debate must
be refined to be more useful in the ongoing analysis of the Supreme Court.

1. THE SHRINKING DOCKET AND CONSERVATIVE JUDGES
The Court has been taking fewer cases in recent years in all categories. The
fact that the Court is taking fewer business cases does not necessarily mean that
the Justices are not interested in business issues or that the law clerks are
steering the Justices away from these issues. It may simply be the result of the
reduction in the number of cases argued before the Court.
While some critics are concerned by the shrinking docket, many
conservatives applaud the restraint of the Court. 134 Two commentators who are
not conservatives themselves have explained this view. Dick Howard of the
University of Virginia stated, "The Court that legal journalists and Courtwatchers find a bit boring may be precisely the Court that conservatives
want."' 35 Mark Tushnet of Georgetown University Law Center commented that
"[o]ne thing conservatives want to do is to reduce the significance of the
the number of
Supreme Court in public life. One way to do that is to reduce
'13 6
cases and to limit the cases that gain the public's attention."
Another view, as stated by Jesse Choper of the University of California
(Berkeley) Law School, is that, "A new dynamic has taken place which is that
the lower courts have generally caught up with the Supreme Court." '37 If the
lower courts have caught up with the Supreme Court, it may be because there
is a larger number of conservatives and moderates in the federal court system
than in other years. Presidents Reagan and Bush appointed 115 judges to the
federal courts of appeals.' By 1992, their nominees accounted for 60 percent
of the circuit judges in active service. 3 9
The Clinton Administration's nominations to the federal judiciary do not
seem to have caused a large ideological shift in that branch of government. By
January 1, 1995, two years into President Clinton's first term, the percentage of
judges in the federal judiciary that were appointed by Republican presidents had
not changed substantially."4 Due to the fact that during the first two years of
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See W. John Moore, Court Is in Recess, NAT. J., Oct. 30, 1993 at 2587.
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Id. at 2591-92.
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his term Democrats controlled the Senate, the Clinton Administration had
greater control over the individuals that were appointed to the federal bench
than it had in subsequent years. 4 t With the Republican take over of both
houses of Congress in 1994, "President Clinton [did] not recommend attorneys
whose candidacies might lead to confirmation fights."' 42 Despite the
Administration's careful selection of nominees, in 1997, the Judiciary
Committee may have slowed the confirmation process of Clinton nominees
because many of the nominees were viewed by Judiciary Committee Chairman,
Orin Hatch, as "judicial activists."' 43 As a result of the realities of the political
process, "[m]ost of the attorneys [nominated by the Clinton Administration]
have relatively moderate political views, and a few have Republican Party
affiliations." 144
Despite President Clinton's appointments, the Supreme Court is still a
conservative institution. The Justices with conservative ideologies sitting on the
Court are not likely to seek out cases to grant review due to their desire to limit
the role of the judicial system in American life. 45 Also, commentators have
argued that due to the conservative to moderate nature of the federal bench "the
46
Justices see fewer cases they want to overturn."
The fact that conservative and moderate judges dominate the federal judicial
system may also account for the criticisms directed at the Court. The
commentators who believe the Court should be taking an active role in society
will be more likely to complain that the Court is not taking the right cases. This
fact will be especially true if the Court does not grant review to the cases the
commentators deem to be important. Also, judicial activists lost many of their
supporters on the Court in recent years. The retirements of Justices Brennan,
Marshall, and Blackmun, all but ended the judicial activism of the Court. They
were seen as the "stalwarts of the liberal wing of the Burger Court" and their
retirements may help explain why the Court is not reaching out to take on new
issues.147

Cass R. Sunstein, Professor of Law at the University of Chicago, has stated
that "[j]udges often use silence for pragmatic or strategic reasons or to promote
141

(1998).
142

See Carl Tobias, Fostering Balance on the Federal Courts, 47 AM. U. L REv. 935,937-947
Id. at 947 (citing Joan S. Biskupic, Facing Fights on Court Nominees, Clinton Yields, WASH.

POST, Feb. 13, 1995 at Al).
143
Id. at 953 (citing 143 Cong. Rec. S2515, S2536 (statement of Sen. Hatch) (voicing displeasure
with legislating through judicial appointments)).
I"
Id. at 953. See also Carl Tobias, Choosing Federal Judges in the Second Clinton
Administration, 24 HASTING CONST. L Q. 741 (1997)).
145
See Gest, supra note 1.
146
See id.
147
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democratic goals."' 4 He defined this practice as "judicial minimalism,' which
is the "phenomenon of saying no more than necessary to justify an outcome, and
leaving as much as possible undecided."' 49 He uses this theory, among other
things, as an explanation for the Court's behavior in the certiorari process. 50
While discussing how the Court may treat same-sex marriages, Sunstein stated:
The Court might want to leave that issue undecided not only because
it (1) cannot reach a consensus or (2) lacks relevant information, but
also because it (3) is unsure about the (legally relevant) moral
commitments, (4) thinks that people have a right to decide this issue
democratically, or (5) believes that a judicial ruling could face intense
political opposition in a way that would be counterproductive to the
way moral and political claims that it is being asked to endorse.''
These reasons may help to explain why the Court grants certiorari to so few
cases. By not granting review, the Justices are not only limiting the judiciary's
role in American life, they are "try[ing] to reduce the burdens of judgment for
Supreme Court justices, to minimize the risks of error .... and to maximize the
space for democratic deliberation about basic political and moral issues."' 52
2. USE OF LAW CLERKS/THE CERT POOL

The use of law clerks and the establishment of the cert pool have long been
targets for the critics of the Supreme Court. Some critics argue that the law
clerks are not interested in commercial law issues and instead are directing the
Justices toward the "sexier" constitutional cases. 53 Also, the critics seem to
believe that the Justices may fail to see the importance of non-tax business cases
when they only read the cert pool memorandum prepared by a disinterested,
inexperienced law clerk.
These criticisms are highly speculative. The fact remains that without the
cert pool or the help of their law clerks, the Justices would accomplish even less
149

Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court 1995 Term: Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110

HARV. L.REv. 6, 7-8 (1996) (arguing that minimalism is democracy-forcing and "makes sense when the
Court is dealing with an issue of high complexity about which many people feel deeply and on which the
nation is in flux (moral or otherwise)").
149
Id. at 14 (categorizing Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer as
minimalists).
150
See id. at 7.
151
Id. at 20.
152
Id. at 99.
153
See Gest, supra note 1,at 24. See also McAllister, supra note 11,at 27; Savage, supra note 3,
at 42; and Starr, supra note 7,at A23.
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work than they do today. If they were being used improperly, or if they caused
the Court to ignore an important issue, the Justices would disband the pool
and/or fire their clerks. It is hard to believe that the Justices are being
outsmarted by law clerks who block business issues from coming before the
Court. It is also unlikely that Justices would allow their clerks or the cert pool
memorandums to make their decisions for them.
D. Other FactorsAffecting Certiorari
1. AMICUS CURIAE PARTICIPATION

a. Influence on the CertiorariProcess
Amicus curiae is Latin for "friend of the court."'' In most cases, private
amicus participation in litigation is limited to the "raising [of] jurisdictional and
other important issues overlooked by the parties, assuring the presentation of
complete factual scenario, and suggesting potential implications of the court's
decision.""'
Governmental bodies are not as limited in their amicus
participation as private parties. 136 They are often called upon to offer their
institutional expertise and to provide "a valuable means of determining how the
court's decision may affect the world outside its chambers."' 5
Under Rule 37 of the Supreme Court, a private party may file an amicus
curiae brief at the certiorari stage either by consent of the litigants or by leave
of the Court.' The government may file an amicus curiae brief without filing
a motion or obtaining leave of the Court."s9 In their research of organized
interests and agenda setting in the Supreme Court, Gregory A. Caldeira and
John R. Wright determined that the cost of preparing an amicus curiae brief

4
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Michael K. Lowman, The Litigating Amicus Curiae: When Does the Party Begin After the

Friends Leave?, 41 AM. U. L REv. 1243, 1258-59 (1992). See generally Samuel Krislov, The Amicus
Curiae Brief. From Friendship to Advocacy, 72 YALE LJ.694 (1963).
156
See Lowman, supra note 155, at 1261.
157
Id. at 1261-62.
158 See SUP. CT. R. 37.2(a)(b) (1990).

"No motion for leave to file an amicus curiaebrief is necessary if the brief is presented on behalf
of the Untied States by the Solicitor General; on behalf of any agency of the United States allowed by law
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At the time Caldeira and Wright wrote their article in 1988, the Supreme
Court Rules stated that amicus curiae briefs were disfavored at the certiorari
stage. 62 The current rules, however, only disfavor a motion for leave to file an
amicus curiae brief when one of the litigants has withheld consent. 63 Whether
favored or disfavored, Caldeira and Wright determined that the Justices pay
attention to amicus briefs in their decisions to grant or deny certiorari.' 64 "Not
only does one brief in favor of certiorari significantly improve the chances of
a case being accepted, but two, three or four briefs improve the chances even
more .... In general, the more briefs filed in favor of certiorari on any given
case, the better the chances for plenary review."' 6 Caldeira and Wright also
found that "[w]hen a case involves a real conflict or when the federal
government is a petitioner, the addition of just one amicus curiae brief in
support of certiorari increases the likelihood of plenary review by 40%-50%."166
Interestingly, briefs in opposition to certiorari "significantly increase - rather
than decrease - the likelihood that the Supreme Court will grant review."' 6 7
b. The Government as Amicus
Caldeira and Wright's research showed that amicus curiae briefs by the
Solicitor General had significant impact on the certiorari process. 6 The
persuasive effects of an anicus curiae brief filed by the government can be seen
through the experience of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 69
The SEC works closely with the Solicitor General when filing an amicus curiae

16
See Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, Organized Interests andAgenda Setting in the U.S.
Supreme Court, 82 AM. POL Sci. REv. 1109,1112(1988). For a discussion of the agenda setting function
of the Supreme Court, see H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING INTHE UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT (1991).
161
See Caldeira & Wright, supra note 160, at 1112.
162
See id. (citing former SUP. CT. R. 36.1).
163
See SUP. CT. R. 37.2(b).
I"
See Caldeira & Wright, supra note 160. at 1119.
165
Id.
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d at 1122.

Id. at 1119.

See id. at ll20.
See David S. Ruder, The Development of Legal Doctrine Through Amicus Participation: The
SEC Experience, 1989 WIS. L REV. 1167.
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brief. 7 ' "The Commission rarely seeks to file a brief in the Supreme Court that
is not supported by [the Solicitor General's] office."''
The SEC determines whether or not to file an amicus curiae brief if (1) the
decision in the case would have an impact on the Commission's enforcement
program or put into question the scope of the federal securities laws; (2) the
relationship between state and federal law is at issue; (3) the decision will have
a substantial impact on private enforcement of the federal securities laws; (4)
the case will provide an opportunity to guide the court to a safe, narrow holding,
instead of a broad damaging one; and (5) the case will provide the Commission
with the opportunity to make a needed policy statement.'72
Often, the Commission will not file an amicus curiae brief in a case that
does not provide "a suitable vehicle" for the legal controversy, even if the
The SEC's
Commission believes that the lower court decision is wrong.'
selectivity may indicate to the Court the importance of the cases in which the
Commission chooses to file an amicus brief.
During the 1995 term, of the nine non-tax business-related cases reviewed
by the Court, only one case did not have any amicus participation. That case
involved bankruptcy issues. The four other bankruptcy cases reviewed by the
Court involved amicus briefs. Of the eight cases with amicus participation, only
one was purely private with no participation of a governmental body. While the
number of non-reviewed cases with or without amicus participation was not
studied, the fact that there was amicus participation in eight of the nine non-tax
business cases reviewed by the Court may be significant. These statistics seem
to indicate that amici participation does influence the Court's decisions on
certiorari. Also, the fact that the filing of amicus curiae briefs is an expensive
proposition, and that governmental bodies are particularly selective in the cases
in which they participate, may indicate to the Justices the importance of the
issues in the case. These findings, at the very least, do not contradict Caldeira
and Wright's study. 74
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Id. at 1176-77 (citing Address of Daniel L Goelzer,General Counsel, United States Securities

and Exchange Commission, to the American Bar Association Committee on Federal Regulation of
Securities, Securities and Exchange Commission Amicus Participation in Private Securities Utigation
(November 19, 1988)).
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2. INTERCIRCUIT CONFLIeS
Two of the three criteria for the granting of certiorari petitions enumerated
in the Supreme Court's Rule 10.1 concern conflicts between the federal circuits
75
or between the federal court of appeals and a state court of last resort.
Professor Arthur D. Hellman conducted an extensive study on intercircuit
conflicts. 7 6 He concluded that, "intercircuit conflicts do not constitute a
problem of serious magnitude in the federal judicial system."' 7 7
Hellman investigated only those intercircuit conflicts that were brought to
the Supreme Court and were not granted review.7 First, Hellman studied all
the cases in which Justice White dissented from the denial of review in the
1988, 1989, and 1990 Terms, and every fifth case docketed in which review was
denied for the 1989 Term.'79 Second, Hellman identified which of those
certiorari petitions contained an intercircuit conflict for further investigation
into the Court's reasons for denying review," Third, Hellman identified the
type of conflict involved, its tolerability, and, in some cases, the ultimate

resolution of the conflict.'
a. Types of Conflicts
Hellman considered a conflict to be waning if it was resolved by a
subsequent Supreme Court decision, the circuit court precedent was
"devitalized," or the conflict "although never overruled, [was] so widely
rejected or so consistently ignored that a lawyer would have little hope of
invoking it successfully.' 8 2
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See Sup. CT. R. 10.
See Arthur D. Hellman, By Precedent Unbound: The Nature and Extent of Unresolved

IntercircuitConflicts, 56 U. Prri. L REv. 693 (1995) [hereinafter Hellman, By PrecedentUnbound]. See
also, Arthur D. Helman, The Supreme Court, the NationalLaw, and the Selection of Cases of the Plenary
Docket, 44 U. Prrr. L REv. 521 (1983); Hellman, Shrunken Docket, supranote 30; Michael S. Shenberg,
Identification, Tolerability; and Resolution of Intercircuit Conflicts: Reexamining ProfessorFeeney's
Study of Conflicts in FederalLaw, 59. N.Y.U. L REv. 1007 (1984); and Michael F. Sturley, Observations
on the Supreme Court's CertiorariJurisdiction in IntercircuitConflict Cases, 67 TEX. L REV. 1251
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See Hellman, By PrecedentUnbound,supra note 176, at 697.
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See id. at 702.
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Nonacquiesence involves the concern that a federal agency will have to
"abandon uniformity in the administration of a statutory scheme."' 83 The
conflict would cause government to operate the program differently in each
circuit, abandon the program altogether, or follow the requirements of one
circuit throughout the entire country. 4 Such conflicts may cause multicircuit
actors to engage
in forum shopping, even though Hellman determined that it is
85
unlikely.
b. Tolerability
Hellman determined that the respondent's brief in cases involving
intercircuit conflicts usually contained one of the following three arguments
against the Court's granting review: (1) it was too early to resolve the conflict
definitively; (2) the case provided an inappropriate vehicle for resolving the
conflict; or (3) the issue was not of continuing importance. 6 Hellman also
looked at the dynamics of a conflict. "This concept embraces such
considerations as the number of circuits that have passed on the issue, the age
of the decisions, the trend in the more recent cases, and the possible effect of
intervening Supreme Court decisions on closely related issues."' 87
Unresolved conflicts can lead to due process and unfairness concerns;
conflicting precedents between the circuits could cause individuals in separate
parts of the country to be treated differently. 8 All conflicts, however, may be
deemed tolerable if the "stakes are sufficiently low," such as procedural issues
that are unlikely to cause harm to litigants or, if they come into play, would be
mooted by later proceedings. 9
A conflict will only be considered intolerable if it saddles multicircuit
actors with inconsistent obligations and forces them to choose between
"disunity in operations and conformity with the law."''
The determination of
intolerability will "depend entirely on whether the conflict creates 'unfairness
to litigants in different circuits."" 9 ' Unfairness, in turn, will depend on whether
the conflict will produce different outcomes in later cases."
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c. Do Unresolved Conflicts Really Warrant Concern?
Hellman's research indicates that it may not be a serious problem for the
Supreme Court's decision to leave intercircuit conflicts unresolved. Intercircuit
conflicts can be eliminated in ways other than having the Supreme Court grant
review. First, conflicts left unresolved in one term can be eradicated by a
Supreme Court decision in another term. 93 Second, conflicts can be resolved
when "Congress, rule making bodies, or federal agencies clarify the ambiguity
in the law that gives rise to the conflict."'' Third, one of the conflicted circuits
could overrule its precedent and eliminate the conflict.' 95 Finally, changes in
business practices, governmental policies, or social values may lessen the
impact of the conflict.'
While the aggregate number of intercircuit conflicts that go unresolved may
have risen, for the most part, 97 it is important to recognize that the Court has
never been able to resolve every intercircuit conflict. As Rule 10 of the
Supreme Court specifies, petitions will only be granted for "compelling
reasons."' 9 To make a determination as to whether the conflicts left unresolved
by the Court are intolerable, and therefore compelling, the certiorari papers of
all such cases would have to be examined by someone with a certain level of
expertise in the topic to assess the ramifications of the issues involved.
However, it is possible to conclude that the Court is not taking certain conflict
cases because it has determined that the conflicts are tolerable.
If in fact the Court is leaving intolerable conflicts unresolved, the
commentators must identify specific cases and explain the significance of the
issues involved. They should identify (1) who is being harmed by the conflict;
(2) how individuals or corporations are being harmed by inconsistent
determinations by the circuits; and (3) how individuals or corporations are being
treated differently in the circuits.
V. CONCLUSION

The objective of this Comment was to analyze the criticism that the Court
is not taking the right number of business cases. Commentators have claimed
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that the Justices are not reviewing business cases because they are not interested
in these issues or their law clerks are directing them toward sexier constitutional
cases. It is true that the Court has been taking fewer business cases. This,
however, does not mean that the Court is not taking the correct number of these
cases. The trend in the business cases has been consistent with that of the
Court's review of tax cases - another unglamorous category. Furthermore, the
decline in business cases is consistent with the Court's treatment of its entire
docket.
The certiorari process is influenced by numerous factors. The Justices must
consider all such factors to determine whether a case meets the Court's criteria
for review. The Justices cannot, however, take every eligible case. Each case
must present an issue of national importance, the resolution of which will reach
beyond the litigants in the case. Also, there may be a number of explanations,
other than the issues presented in an individual case, for the overall reduction
in the Court's docket and the decline in business cases. For instance, the
Justices may be attempting to reduce their influence in society. Another
possibility is that the cases before the Court are not certworthy.
The commentators have created more questions than they have answered.
The criticisms are not sufficiently developed to play a useful role in the ongoing
debate surrounding the Court's work. If the commentators are to be taken
seriously, the debate must be focused and refined. Simply complaining that the
Court is not taking the right cases is not enough.
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APPENDIX A

Percentage of Non-Tax Business Cases
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Percentage of Tax Cases
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